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Abstract

by comparing out-of-pocket expenses on healthcare in
South Asia, LMICs and high-income countries (HICs).2 The
private expenditures make up 57% of the total spending
in South Asia compared to 24% in HIC, and out-of-pocket

The newly established provincial healthcare commissions
in Pakistan have started certification of healthcare
providers. The policy-makers perceive that without thirdparty certification or licencing the
healthcare quality will be suboptimal in the
country. This paper reviews the current
literature on third-party certification and
studies objectives and progress of the
largest healthcare commission in Pakistan.
It analyses the certification role of the
Punjab Healthcare Commission and draw
lessons for future regulation and
strengthening of the quality reporting
process. It also documents the short-term
and long-term trade-off resulting from the
enforcement of quality certification in the
absence of appropriate alternative
investment in medical training and care
Source: Authors compilation from, Global Health Expenditure Database.26
provisions in the country for uncertified
providers. The paper concludes with a
Figure-1: Health finance stylised facts.
roadmap for future research to improve
healthcare regulation in Pakistan.
payments represent almost half of the current health
Keywords: Healthcare provider, Regulation, Care quality,
expenditures in South Asia (Figure-1). Given the nature
Third-party certification.
and extent of mixed health system, the regulation of
DOI: http://doi.org/10.47391/JPMA.910
private healthcare is an important agenda item in
healthcare policy in LMICs, including South Asia.

Introduction

The regulation of healthcare industry in low- and middleincome countries (LMICs) is minimal.1 LMICs in general,
and South Asia in particular have mixed health systems
where private and public healthcare services exist in
parallel. There is a large government-funded national
health system in many LMICs which is in some sense
regulated due to standard operating rules and
government ownership, but the substantial portion of
demand of health services fall on private and nongovernment health system, and this fact can be validated

1Department of Economics, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, 2Aga

Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Correspondence: Amir Jahan Khan. Email: ajkhan@iba.edu.pk
J Pak Med Assoc

In addition, the transactions in healthcare industry
involve imperfect information, where supplier of the
service (a doctor) has different set of information than the
consumer (patient) or in majority of the cases has more
knowledge (asymmetric information) about the type of
treatment required.3 In the context of poor countries,
asymmetric information in medical care generates
incentives for the healthcare practitioner to oversubscribe
or wrongly subscribe (e.g. quackery). This practice will
have consequences for both prohibitive cost and low
quality, or unnecessarily high quality, for the patients with
limited information about the given treatment's
effectiveness or diagnosis. In a large mixed health system,
it is virtually impossible to monitor each transaction in the
market. Therefore, the regulation of healthcare
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establishments is inevitable if a level playing field is
intended in the healthcare markets of LMICs. The
regulation of health industry includes the certification of
staff, regulation of pharmaceuticals sales, actions against
quackery and issuance of license to healthcare
establishments to enter or operate in the market. There is
a dominant view that without third-party certification or
licencing the healthcare quality in the industry will be
suboptimal.4
Since the start of the current century, public policy focus
in many countries has been shifted from the cost of
healthcare to the quality of service provisions. Although
universal access of healthcare at an affordable cost is a still
priority for many governments, the regulatory authorities
in the mixed health systems, like in Pakistan, have started
raising concern on the quality of healthcare. Third-party
health certifiers play a pivotal role in quality regulation
enforcement in medical care. Third-party certification
affects both the demand for healthcare and the incentives
to improve healthcare quality.4 Health report cards and
pay for performance (P4P) compensations are two
popular policy options in this regard. The report cards
provide information about a health facility to patients and
decision-makers, while P4P compensations link pay
incentives to performance quality of a healthcare worker.
The regulation of healthcare sector and third-party
certification of providers is not common in LMICs, where
healthcare bodies to regulate service provisions are in
early stages.1 In Pakistan, Healthcare Commissions (HCCs)
were established during the first of half of the last decade
in most of the provinces to regulate quality of healthcare
provisions. After the devolution of the health sector to the
provinces, provincial governments in Punjab, Sindh and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) established HCCs in their
respective domains through provincial legislation to
regulate public and private healthcare providers.5,6 One of
the main functions of HCCs is to issue licences to all public
and private healthcare organisations (HCOs) for providing
healthcare services. According to the Punjab Healthcare
Commission (PHC), an HCO or health establishment is
defined as: "a hospital, diagnostic centre, medical clinic,
nursing home, maternity home, dental clinic,
homeopathic clinic, 'tibb' clinic, acupuncture clinic,
physiotherapy clinic or any other premises or
conveyances wholly or partly used for providing
healthcare services".6
To regulate large private establishments along with
public providers looks like an ambitious government
plan. There is significant investment involved in the
establishment of quality care regulation. However, once
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effective quality regulation is in place that can improve
the service delivery quality for millions in the country.
Therefore, a parallel research agenda needs to be
established to evaluate the current interventions by HCCs
and to study how this investment in third-party
regulatory bodies benefit the public and healthcare
providers. To generate proper understanding of thirdparty certification in the current context in Pakistan
requires research. The current reviews was planned to
study the current relevant literature and to study the
objectives and progress of PHC, which is the largest HCC
in Pakistan. PHC was selected as a case study for the
purpose. Also, PHC was selected because the other
provincial HCCs in the country are still in the formative
stage, while PHC is well-established since the approval of
the act by the provincial assembly in 2010. This paper
analyses third-party certification role of PHC and draws
lessons for future policy-making and strengthening of the
quality reporting process. We also planned to analyse the
gap resulting from forcing quality certification in the
absence of appropriate alternative investment in medical
training and care provisions in the country.
This paper is divided into three further parts. The first
section below discusses the current state of third-party
certification in healthcare in selected markets around the
world, and documents the objectives of healthcare
certification and progress to date. The next section
analyses the case of third-party certifiers and documents
PHC's progress with the focus of the role of regulators in
collecting information from providers and practitioners
and the process of making this information available for
patients and public. The last section synthesises the
findings from international practice of third-party
certification and the current practice of licensing by PHC.
We analyse how HCCs can achieve the intended targets of
certification practice and how better quality data can be
generated to improve the current processes. Lessons are
also drawn for future policy and further research.

Third-party certification in healthcare
Third-party certification, regulation, and quality reporting
are interlinked topics in the economics of quality
reporting in healthcare. The apparent link is that
certification and reporting will require enforcement
through an authority such as a regulator or a healthcare
commissioner. The exact nature of the institutions which
enforce quality control and regulation differs across
countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
provides national guidance and advice to improve health
and social care, while Care Quality Commission (CQC)
functions as the independent regulator of all health and
Vol. 70, No. 10, October 2020
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social care services.7,8 Both NICE and CQC are nondepartmental public bodies and are in contrast with the
National Health Service (NHS). In India, the National
Accreditation Board of Hospitals and Healthcare Providers
(NABH) was established in 2006 for the accreditation of
public and private healthcare providers.9 NABH is
employing patient and provider-based quality measures
for the accreditation of quality standards. Given the
nature of healthcare market where asymmetric
information is prevalent, quality control in healthcare is
central to the regulatory bodies. The essential role of
monitoring and reporting quality is to provide
appropriate information to the decision-makers,
including patients and practitioners, that will generate
better incentives and increase efficiency of service
delivery in the health system.
Third-party certification falls under the realm of quality
assurance in healthcare. The two key instruments used in
this context, in sequential order, are licencing of
providers, like hospitals and doctors, and disclosing
information to the patients. Both activities are interlinked,
as data collection is not possible without a formal
registration process at the first stage. Licensing is a
regulatory process which allows a firm's entry into the
market; without a licence the healthcare establishment
cannot operate legally. Licencing involves a certification
activity in a sense, as the licencing authority collects data
on the quality from a provider and then confirms that the
quality exceeds a certain quality threshold. After
certification, the licencing authority or a third-party
evaluates and repots data about quality to the public. For
instance, Healthgardes collects and reports extensive
data on United States healthcare market for decisionmaking to connect patients and providers.10
Licencing healthcare establishment sends signals to
patients regarding the quality of the services. But given
that a licence is essential to operate in the market, it is not
easy to differentiate healthcare providers merely based
on licensing. The licencing alone will not solve the limited
information problem because provision of healthcare is

an "experience good" by nature. Alongside formal
certification, the report cards have been adopted as main
quality assurance mechanism in many markets around
the world. Dranove discussed other quality assurance
mechanisms in detail and has listed shortcomings of
other leading mechanisms, such as branding, personal
experience, and warranties in the context of healthcare.4
The key finding is that where other quality assurance
measures failed to work in healthcare, the space was
captured by healthcare report cards or consumer report
cards. The regulation in Pakistan is so far focussed on
licencing of providers and certification of professionals.
The implementation of health report cards might benefit
the public depending on design and utilisation of these
cards.
Although inputs, processes and outcomes are three
important components, most of the report cards are
based on the clinical outcome (Table-1). The key
questions regarding the definition and measurement of a
health report card are worth having a look at (Table-1). In
the US, 'Medicare' reports death rate for heart attack or
rate of readmission as outcome measures relative to US
national rate for a given hospital.11 As the evidence shows
in the US market, the selection of outcome measures for
reporting is not problem-free. The choice of outcome
measures affects healthcare provider behaviour
depending on the nature of adverse selection,
multitasking problem, and quality distortion problem.
Dranove reviewed these challenges and reported results
on report card performance.4 The literature so far has
focussed on evaluation of the programmes and not much
has been done on designing an optimal scheme.4
Previous studies have addresses three broad type of
questions that are relevant to measure the effectiveness
of third-party certification and licencing in healthcare
industry.4 First, do healthcare providers provide the right
information to regulators or patients? Second, does more
information and knowledge effect the choice of patients
while selecting the healthcare? Third, does providing
more information to patients and third-party reporting

Table-1: Economics of healthcare provider quality reporting: taxonomy.
Goal

What to measure?

Challenges

Provision of more information through
report cards for the patients, the doctors the regulator
for better incentives to enhance efficiency and
improve decision making.

u

Outcomes or changes in clinical outcomes:
mortality rates, surgical complications
u Process: Implementation of SOPs adoption
of accepted processes and guidelines.
u Inputs: Human capital, staff
development, trained nurse ratios.

u

Source: Dranove (2011).4
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Health outcomes are hard to measure
or poorly measured at provider level
u Adjusting for health status risk is difficult.
u The healthcare provider will report or
pick the measures that shows all is good.
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Table-2: Summary of selected studies on third-party certification.
Study [Year/Country]
Brown et al [2013/US]20
Chen & Meinecke [2012/US]21
Chou et al [ 2014/US]13
Kraska et al [2016/Germany]14
Maggard-Gibbons [2014/US]18
Paddock et al [2015/US]22
Pesis-Katz et al [2013/US]23
Scanlon et al [2015/US]24
Shi et al [2017/US]15
Sinaiko et al [2012]16
Werner et al [2016/US]25

The impact of exposure to information
No evidence of substantial use of public reporting of cardiac surgeon report cards, no substantial use of publicly available information by doctors
at the time of discussion or referral for cardiac surgery.
No evidence on patient selection by providers, only minor decline (0.05 percentage points) in mortality rate for patients with bypass surgery.
Yes: After the availability of online report cards, hospitals in more competitive markets used more resources per patient and achieved lower
mortality among more severely ill patients.
Yes: Results indicate a positive effect of public reporting on hospital care, independent of a hospital's profit orientation. Improvements in the
quality of care were registered for all observed quality indicators over time, but public reporting stimulated a faster improvement in quality.
Yes: Findings show that feeding outcomes back to healthcare providers, along with real-time comparisons with other hospital rates, leads to
quality improvement, better health outcomes, cost savings and overall improved patient safety.
No: Current information not useful due to low variation in the report cards score. Analyses illustrate the need for further innovations in the design
of public report cards to enhance their utility for consumers
Yes: Evidence on choice consideration in nursing home selection. Consumers choose a nursing home based on the quality dimensions that are
easy for them to observe, evaluate, and apply to their situation.
Yes/No: Investment in care quality information provisions results in modest change in awareness about physician quality among patient with
long term conditions. But no significant increase in awareness of hospital quality was observed in the study.
Yes: Among those who were not aware of physician quality at the baseline the likelihood of physician quality awareness increased by 3.8
percentage points once physician information was available in community.
No: Authors found broad agreement that public reporting has been disconnected from consumer decisions about providers because of
weaknesses in report card content, design, and accessibility.
Yes: The nursing home star rating system significantly affected consumer demand for high- and low-rated nursing homes.

improve quality of healthcare? The answer to these
questions can be useful in evaluating new licencing and
certification initiatives in Pakistan and other LMICs.
Literature has answered the above questions regarding
report cards in recent years. For the current review,
studies were selected after search on Medline database at
Elton B. Stephens Co (EBSCO) with key words "report
cards AND healthcare OR "health care" for the period
between January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2017.
Do healthcare providers disclose quality of service
provisions? Most scholars start with Grossman's 1981
theory of unravelling which suggests that under certain
assumptions, providers will disclose information even in
the absence of third-party certification.12 However, the
two important assumptions for theory of unravelling are
untenable in most situations prevailing in LMICs. The first
assumption says that in a given market healthcare
providers are fully aware of quality of each other. The
second assumption says that beliefs about quality held by
consumers are consistent with provider quality. Under the
second assumption, a provider will declare quality only if
it is certain that quality is higher than the general belief
held by the consumers.4 Healthcare professionals also
voluntarily declare some information, like their
professional qualifications which are prominently
displayed in the clinics.
Studies show a mix evidence for the certification of
providers and provision of care quality to patients and

community. Based on the evidence collected from the
review, some findings require attention. There is
conflicting evidence on the impact of quality disclosure
on hospital mortality rates. There is some evidence of
positive health gains in more competitive markets.13 This
finding is important for healthcare markets with the
presence of large number of private providers as these
providers will be competing for consumers in a giver
market, and disclosure can result in potential vertical
sorting.
There is also evidence that providers improve quality
reporting standards after the implementation of thirdparty certification requirement which is accompanied by
more consumer awareness about comparative hospital
quality.14,15 The improvement in hospital reporting of
quality is not free of problem if there are incentives in the
reporting of the listed indicators. Hospitals can also
improve the reporting on indicators which shows a better
picture of the hospital rather than improvements in actual
care experience of the patients. Finally, studies show that
there is need to improve the reporting standards and
better-designed health reporting system for the
certification process.4,16

Quality regulation and licencing in Pakistan
The regulation of healthcare sector and third-party
certification is not common in LMICs and the quality care
regulators are in their early stages in many countries.1
Lack of regulation of health industry is considered a major
Vol. 70, No. 10, October 2020
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challenge and the absence of checks in health system
results in low quality and inequitable health service
delivery.5 The current research on the economics of
healthcare also demonstrate that since the last decade,
public policy focus has shifted to quality considerations
from cost considerations.4 The reporting of medical
negligence, maladministration and malpractice cases is
common in LMICs.1,17 Similar realisations have led
provincial governments in Pakistan to put in place legal
provisions for installing healthcare quality regulators.
These organisations are formed to improve quality of
healthcare and ban quackery in medical practice. We
planned to focus on the Punjab province only as the care
commissions in other provinces are in very early stages of
formation while in Punjab, the commission is functional
since 2010. The framework of quality regulation is quite
similar in other provinces as well, where all the regulatory
bodies are formed through provincial legislation.
The experience of PHC and related analysis are based on
data from published and official PHC sources, including
PHC's social media account and its website.6 The analysis
is conducted to address two fundamental questions; how
PHC collects and processes the information related to
quality of providers; and what are the actions by PHC that
might signal or directly provide information about
provider's quality to the public and patients.

Figure-2: Healthcare commission's registration and licencing mechanism.
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In Punjab, the third-party certification process consists of
key components of registration and licensing of the
providers. Registration and licensing are two interlinked
but distinct concepts. According to the PHC Act, "an
unregistered healthcare service provider shall not provide
healthcare services". Licencing is the second stage of
third-party certification. The mechanism of registration
and licencing is public knowledge (Figure-2). It is evident
that without PHC registration, no one can provide
healthcare services in the medium to long run otherwise
penalties will be implemented by the commission for any
violation of the PHC Act 2010.
The coverage of registration and provisional licence data
compiled by PHC shows that in total 57,221 healthcare
providers are registered with the PHC.6 The private
providers account for 91%, which highlights the scale of
private healthcare in the provision of overall health
services in the most populous parts of the country. The
nature of limited information problem in medical practice
and existence of private healthcare provision at such a
large scale requires an effective regulatory regime.
Therefore, the establishment of regional HCCs in Pakistan
looks like a step in the right direction. About 71 % of the
registered providers have been issued the provisional
licences by the PHC. Disaggregated data shows that only
54% of the registered public healthcare providers are
provisionally licensed, while this figure is 73% for the
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According to the PHC Act, "the
commission may, before issuing the
license,
inspect
the
healthcare
establishment which is to be licensed…".
It means providers with provisional
licences are subject to a regulator visit to
verify the "information about provider
services" and, if validated, the regulator
then issues the regular licence. The nonverification of providers by PHC and not
confirming regular licence to majority of
providers raises quality concerns and
underlines the prevalence of poor-quality
healthcare service delivery at a wider scale
in the country.

Source: Authors compilation from PHC (2019)6

Figure-3: Number of registered and licenced healthcare providers in Punjab.

private providers (Figure-3).
The issuance of provisional licence is a signal of quality of
healthcare in terms of data collected by PHC. The provider
licence is usually displayed along with certification of
healthcare staff at the site and a visiting patient can
observe and consider it as a minimum quality (e.g.
signalling) at a provider. Although it is not clear why
regular licence has not been issued to any healthcare
provider so far, as according to the PHC policy, the regular
licence has to be issued within 30 days of the acceptance
of the application.

Recently, PHC has launched a helpline for
public to report any fake healthcare
establishment, and has encouraged
patients to approach only the licenced
providers. It means licence will be a
signalling for quality certification and will
improve the service delivery. Further, PHC
is providing information on the antiquackery actions through print, electronic
and social media. PHC has closed more
than 6,000 clinics run by quacks and this
process continues.6 The quackery
prevalence appears quite high in the
region; in size equal to one quarter of the
total licenced private providers. More than
70% of these quacks were operating in
conventional
medical
care.
The
geographical concentration of sealed
clinics appears to be high at about 75%
happened to be in just 4 districts of the
province.
Therefore,
a
further
understanding of nature and extent of
anti-quackery actions is required to
analyse the regional variation in the
prevalence of quackery. According to the
PHC Act, the commission works "to
improve quality of healthcare services and ban quackery
in the Punjab in all its forms and manifestations". Apart
from the quality assurance action of PHC, policy actions
described below will have far reaching implications for
the largest healthcare delivery system in the country.

Lessons learned and way forward
The discussion thus far raises relevant questions. First, the
licencing of large number of private providers in Punjab
confirms the high prevalence of private medical care in
Punjab which shows that substantial healthcare demand
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falls on private providers. If the private providers are
competing for patients in a competitive market, then
disclosure of medical care quality will increase patient
welfare.18 The better knowledge about quality of
providers can lead to sorting of patients over providers,
where the share of patients with high-quality providers
will increase after the disclosure of the information. This
hypothesis needs to be tested in Punjab in the context of
PHC's current and proposed interventions. Second, as
literature shows that lack of variation in quality reporting
at provider will not be of much attraction for patient
decision making, the current licencing practice by PHC
will not create substantial variation in reporting, as either
a provider will be licensed or not licensed. The current
practice of licencing in Pakistan need to be augmented
with further quality reporting on providers. Although PHC
is implementing the minimum service delivery standards,
further research is required to understand the impact of
this practice on quality of reporting to patients.6
Designing the report card and appropriate instruments in
the local context shall be high on the future research
agenda.

Conclusion

Third, how to motivate people to attend licenced
provider? This shall be a key arear of research. For the time
being, PHC advertises and announces through social
media and encourages public to report fake providers and
to attend licenced providers only. How effective are these
current quality reporting measures? And how the digital
revolution, smartphone, and internet access can be
capitalised to provide information on quality of the
providers to patients and stakeholders? Further research
is required to address these questions.

Conflict of Interest: None.

Finally, there is little knowledge available on the extent
and uptake of various service providers. The government
data in Punjab shows that about 80% demand of primary
care nature is catered to by private healthcare providers,
potentially including informal providers, like quacks.19 In
this context, anti-quackery intervention by PHC will have
substantial consequences on the healthcare market and
the welfare of patients in the region. So far, PHC has
closed down 6,000 clinics where healthcare services were
provided by non-qualified staff. The closure of providers
at such a large scale will burden the licenced providers
(particularly public) or will suppress the healthcare
demand. Although, PHC is running training workshops, it
is not clear how far untrained staff form closed facilities
will benefit from these limited trainings. Further research
is required to understand this balance between training
the untrained staff at non-licenced facilities and
restricting healthcare care provisions to only licenced
providers.
J Pak Med Assoc

Over the last decade, health policy focus has shifted from
cost considerations to quality concerns in the delivery of
medical care. HCCs are established to regulate healthcare
quality at the provincial level in Pakistan by providing
third-party certification. The evidence on number of
licenses issued by PHC showed that private providers
were operational at a large scale in Punjab in a
competitive market. Literature review also found that the
disclosure of the quality leads to better healthcare
provisions in competitive healthcare markets. Therefore, a
provider level health quality information reporting
mechanism in the shape of a report card can potentially
impact the quality of care in a competitive healthcare
market like Punjab. Licencing or certification reveals
healthcare provider quality. However, to differentiate
among providers for quality requires reporting of health
outcomes along with the licencing practice by PHC. There
is need of further evidence collection to test many policyrelated hypotheses proposed in the paper.
Disclaimer: None.
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